Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Third Anglo Burmese War

Important wars and battles in Indian History

Third Anglo Burmese War 1865 A.D.


The reasons of war   
The war broke out between Britain and Burma third time in 1885. The main reason of this war was two earlier wars and continued dispute between Burma and India. King Theebaw became the King in 1878 of Burmese throne after putting to death eighty rivals trying to be the king of Burma.  British had protested against this action but the King Theebaw ignored this. Further the Burmese were doing monopolies in trading which was the reason of conflict between the two.  One more reason of this war was the expansion of French trading in Asia.  These two reasons invited the Third Burmese War.                                
The War Process
The British wanted to get complete control on the Burma’s raw material and for this it was necessary for the British to remove the King Theebaw from the Burma throne and attach Burma to British control.  Major General Prendergast who was the leader of this expedition collected troops from India. He achieved his aim to remove King Theebaw very soon.  In November 1885 he crossed Burmese Border and proceeded towards Irrawaddy river.  British traders were trading for the long time with their steamers. These traders were very much familiar with this route.  As the British were getting more powers which led the Burma to take decision to start a decisive attack on British. On Seventeenth of November 1985, the British occupied Minhla and after that within eleven days war they arrested King Theebaw.  British dethroned him from the Burma Empire and Burma was complete annexed with British Empire. The people of Burma were of the trust that as British had annexed Burma, the armies of British would leave Burma soon but they realized that the armies of British were there to trace Burmese soldiers those had returned to their villages.  Hence these Burmese soldiers started to form private armies to destroy the British. Responding to this British constructed many forts at many place in Burma. The British armies were divided into small groups increasing conflict “The Subalterns’ War”.  The enemies were attacked at various places in small groups.  These were the small battles.  The Historians told that as per records only 17 men were killed, about 35 persons were wounded and around 150 were killed of the 13th Regiment of Foot.

Brief timeline of Burma

300 BC                                   A great civilization exists in Burma
 100 AD                                   A people called the Pyu settle in northern Burma
9th Century AD                   A great civilisation exists in Burma
849                                         Pagan is founded
1044                                       Anawrahta becomes king of Pagan
1057                                       Anawrahta founds the first Burmese Empire
1287                                       The Mongols invade Burma
15th Century                         An Italian named Nicolo di Conti is the first European to reach Burma
17th Century                        The British, Dutch and French trade with Burma
1785                                        Bodawapaya becomes ruler of all Burma
1824-36                                    The Burmese fight the British
1886                                       Britain becomes the ruler of all of Burma
1932                                       A rebellion in Burma is crushed
1937                                       Burma is made a separate colony from India
1942                                       Japan invades Burma. The Japanese capture Mandalay in May.
1944                                       The British advance into Burma
1945                                       In March the British capture Mandalay
1948                                       Burma becomes independent
1962                                        General Win seizes power. He announces the 'Burmese way to Socialism'.
1988                                        Demonstrations are held in Burma but the army continues to hold power
1999                                       The ILO recommends sanctions against Burma because of the use of forced labor
2007                                        Demonstrations in Burma are brutally crushed
2008                                       Cyclone Narqis devastates Burma
2010                                       Aung San Suu Kyi is released

2012                                       She wins elections



Second Anglo Burmese War

Important wars and battles in Indian History

Second Anglo Burmese War 1852 A.D.



After the First Anglo-Burmese war, the Treaty of Yandabu was signed between Burma and East India Company on February 24, 1826. For next 20 years the relations were normal, but the Burma Kings were chaffed of the English merchants who started flocking in the country and got settled over there. In 1851, these merchants complained their overlords sitting in Calcutta about the oppression of the Burmese officials at Rangoon. The issue was taken seriously by the East India Company and the Lord Dalhousie asked Burma for compensation. No reply was sent from the other end. The idea was to made it a reason for an imposed war on Burma. Apart from that there were minor bilateral issues regarding the Treaty of Yandabu. However, exactly under which circumstances, this war was fought was not made public. The war started in April 5, 1852 and as soon as the war started the port of Martaban was taken on the same day. On 12th April Rangoon was annexed and in June Pegu was taken. In January 1853, a proclamation of annexation was read out and thus this war ended without any treaty signed. The outcome of this war was that Pegu was annexed to the British Empire and it was renamed Lower Burma. British dominion now was from Chittagong to Singapore in the East. Lord Dalhousie was able to change the map of British India considerably. It was he, who waged a war against Burma (Second Anglo-Burmese War) without any considerable reasons other than his desire to exclude all other European powers from Burma and expand the territory of the British Empire. The second Anglo Sikh war ended in the annexation of Punjab. Both of these annexations were made by Proclamations and not by any treaty. Lord Dalhousie reduced the Punjab and planted British standard at Peshawar, and then he became involved with the government of Burma which had always been obstinate and foolhardy in dealings with the foreigners such as Chinese and British. The Burmese could not guess in the war of 1826 (First Anglo Burmese War) that they were practically at the mercy of a very strong maritime power in the Bay of Bengal, which could occupy the whole of their seaboard and penetrate up to the Irawadi River. The over intelligent rulers of Burma could understand the military supremacy of Britain only after the second Anglo Burmese War, which ended with the official proclamation of annexation of Lower Burma (Pegu) on December 20, 1852. This conquest made the British Possessions continuous along the Eastern Shores of the Bay of Bengal, from Chittagong to as far as Singapore. The British settlement in Calcutta led to the conquest of Burma and the first step was to set up Rangoon as capital of British Possessions at the bank of River Irawadi.


Second Anglo Sikh War

Important wars and battles in Indian History

Second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49 A.D.


ANGLO-SIKH WAR II, 1848-49, which resulted in the abrogation of the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab, was virtually a campaign by the victors of the first Anglo-Sikh war (1945-46) and since then the de facto rulers of the State finally to overcome the resistance of some of the sardars who chafed at the defeat in the earlier war which, they believed, had been lost owing to the treachery on the part of the commanders at the top and not to any lack of fighting strength of the Sikh army. It marked also the fulfillment of the imperialist ambition of the new governor-general, Lord Dalhousie (184856), to carry forward the British flag up to the natural boundary of India on the northwest. According to the peace settlement of March 1846, at the end of Anglo-Sikh war I, the British force in Lahore was to be withdrawn at the end of the year, but a severer treaty was imposed on the Sikhs before the expiry of that date.
Sir Henry Hardinge, the then governor-general, had his Agent, Frederick Currie, persuade the Lahore Darbar to request the British for the continuance of the troops in Lahore. According to the treaty which was consequently signed at Bharoval on 16 December 1846, Henry Lawrence was appointed Resident with "full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State." A Council of Regency, consisting of the nominees of the Resident and headed by Tej Singh, was appointed. The power to make changes in its personnel vested in the Resident. Under another clause the British could maintain as many troops in the Punjab as they thought necessary for the preservation of peace and order. This treaty was to remain in operation until the minor Maharaja Duleep Singh attained the age of 16. By a proclamation issued in July 1847, the governor-general further enhanced the powers of the Resident. On 23 October 1847, Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to Henry Lawrence: "In all our measures taken during the minority we must bear in mind that by the treaty of Lahore, March 1846, the Punjab never was intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added the chief of the State can neither make war or peace, or exchange or sell an acre of territory or admit a European officer, or refuse us a thoroughfare through his territories, or, in fact, perform any act without our permission. In fact the native Prince is in fetters, and under our protection and must do our bidding."
In the words of British historian John Clark Marshman, "an officer of the Company's artillery became, in fact, the successor to Ranjit Singh." The Sikhs resented this gradual liquidation of their authority in the Punjab. The new government at Lahore became totally unpopular. The abolition of tigers in the Jalandhar Doab and changes introduced in the system of land revenue and its collection angered the landed classes. Maharani Jind Kaur, who was described by Lord Dalhousie as the only woman it the Punjab with manly understanding and in whom the British Resident foresaw a rallying point for the well-wishers of the Sikh dynasty, was kept under close surveillance. Henry Lawrence laid down that she could not receive in audience more than five or six sardars in a month and that she remain in purdah like the ladies of the royal families of Nepal, Jodhpur and Jaipur.
In January 1848, Henry Lawrence took leave of absence and traveled back home with Lord Hardinge, who had completed his term in India. The former was replaced by Frederick Currie and the latter by the Earl of Dalhousie. The new regime confronted a rebellion in the Sikh province of Multan which it utilized as an excuse for the annexation of the Punjab. The British Resident at Lahore increased the levy payable by the Multan governor, Diwan Mul Raj , who, finding himself unable to comply, resigned his office. Frederick Currie appointed General Kahn Singh Man in his place and sent him to Multan along with two British officers P.A. Vans Agnew and William Anderson, to take charge from Mul Raj The party arrived at Multan on 18 April 1848, and the Diwan vacated the Fort and made over the keys to the representatives of the Lahore Darbar But his soldiers rebelled and the British officers were set upon in their camp and killed This was the beginning of the Multan outbreak.
Some soldiers of the Lahore escort deserted their officers and joined Mul Raj's army. Currie received the news at Lahore on 21 April, but delayed action Lord Dalhousie allowed the Multan rebellion to spread for five months. The interval was utilized by the British further to provoke Sikh opinion. The Resident did his best to fan the flames of rebellion. Maharani Jind Kaur, then under detention in the Fort of Sheikupura, was exiled from the Punjab She was taken to Firozpur and thence to Banaras, in the British dominions. Her annual allowance, which according to the treaty of Bharoval had been fixed at one and a half lakh of rupees, was reduced to twelve thousand. Her jewellery worth fifty thousand of rupees was forfeited; so was her cash amounting to a lakh and a half. The humiliating treatment of the Maharani caused deep resentment among the people of the Punjab Even the Muslim ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Dost Muhammad, protested to the British, saying that such treatment is objectionable to all creeds."
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes, the Resident's Assistant at Bannu, having heard of the Multan revolt, began raising levies from among the Pathan mercenaries, and after summoning Van Cortlandt, the local Lahore commander, marched on Multan and called upon the rebels to submit. Although the British Resident approved of Edwardes' conduct, Lord Dalhousie was furious at the audacity of a "subaltern of ficer" to invest Multan without any authority and offer terms to Mul Raj. He was severely reprimanded and ordered not to extend his operations any further. However, Edwardes was not discouraged and ignoring these orders, he crossed the Indus on 14 June; four days later, he inflicted a crushing defeat on Mul Raj's forces at Kineri. Edwarde's action turned Sikh national sentiment in favor of Mul Raj and there was restiveness among the troops. British forces began to be moved towards the frontier. The Lahore garrison was reinforced; likewise more regiments reached Ambala and Firozpur. By June 1848, an army had been assembled at the frontier : 11,740 men in the Bari Doab, 9,430 in the Jalandhar Doab; in all 21,170 men ready to go into action against Multan to quell what was no more than a local rising. Meanwhile, Captain James Abbott, the Resident's assistant at Hazara, suspecting that Sardar Chatar Singh Atarivala, the governor of the province, had been hatching a conspiracy to lead a general Sikh uprising against the British, charged him with treason and cut off all communication with him and marched against him the Muslim peasantry and tribal mercenaries.
Captain Nicholson who conducted an enquiry into Abbott's allegations, exonerated Chatar Singh of the charge of treason, but offered him terms which amounted to his virtual dismissal and the confiscation of his jagirs. Chatar Singh rejected these. Abbott's treatment of Chatar Singh, a chief of eminence and position since Ranjit Singh's time and whose daughter was betrothed to the young Maharaja Duleep Singh, was humiliating. Chatar Singh's son Raja Sher Singh, who had steadfastly fought on the side of Herbert Edwardes against Diwan Mul Raj, was greatly exercised, and he joined hands with the Diwan's force on 14 September 1848.
Raja Sher Singh made a passionate appeal to his countrymen warning them of the fate that awaited the Punjab and inviting them to join his standard in a final bid to preserve their freedom. Many old soldiers of the Khalsa army responded to the call and left their homes to rally round Diwan Mul Raj, Raja Sher Singh and Chatar Singh. Lord Dalhousie received the news of Sher Singh's action with unconcealed pleasure because it had brought matters to the crisis that he had for months been awaiting. At a public banquet on 5 October 1848 at Barrackpore (Calcutta), he announced: "Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and, on my words, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance....We are now not on the eve but in the midst of war with the Sikh nation and the kingdom of the Punjab....I have drawn the sword, and have thrown away the scabbard, both in relation to the war immediately before us, and to the stern policy which that war must precede and establish." The Resident at Lahore found this position legally indefensible and practically untenable. He and his staff were there to superintend and aid the administration of the Sikh State and to look after the interests of the ruler, Maharaja Duleep Singh, during the period of his minority. The Lahore Darbar and the Maharaja had supported the Resident in all his efforts to deal with the situation in Multan and Hazara.
Still the British armies were marched without an open declaration of war towards the Punjab. Lord Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, left his headquarters at Shimla towards the end of October and a huge army was assembled at Firozpur in the beginning of November. The army consisted of four columns. Lord Gough personally commanded 22 infantry divisions (14,419 men), a cavalry division (3,369 horse) and an artillery division with 66 guns, including ten 18-pounder batteries and six 8-inch howitzers drawn by elephants. In addition, there were 6 troops of horse artillery and 3 light and 2 heavy field batteries. Its total strength amounted to 24,404 men (6,396 Europeans). At Lahore, General Wheeler's Occupation Force of 10,000 men held firmly the capital of the Sikhs. In front of the citadel of Multan was the 1st Infantry Division under Major General Whish. The arrival of the Bombay column under Brigadier-General Henry Dundas had augmented its strength to over 21,000 men of all arms. In addition 5,300 men of the Lahore infantry were under British control at Multan. This brought the total regular force at the disposal of Major General Whish at Multan to 26,300 men. Besides, there were irregular Muslim levies and mercenaries raised by the British to fight the Sikhs. Taken in all these and other troops at Hazara, Peshawar, Bannu, Gobindgarh, Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur added up to the total of 1,04,666 men : 61,366 of regular British army, 5,300 of the Lahore army and 38,000 irregular troops; 13,524 cavalry, 123 field and 22 heavy guns, all deployed at various points in the Punjab. The numerical strength of the Sikhs was comparatively much smaller. Lord Cough's dispatches enumerate the Sikh force at Ramnagar and Chillianvala between 30,000 and 40,000 men and at Gujrat 60,000 men and 60 guns, which figures are highly exaggerated by at least Six times the real Sikh forces. The powerful Khalsa army of Ranjit Singh was broken up after its capitulation at Sabhraon in 1849. Its soldiers had been disbanded by the British, its generals discharged or won over, and its jagirdan force reduced to starvation. A skeleton army of 25 battalions (20,000 men) and 12,000 horse permitted to the State under the treaty of March 1846 was a shadow force under British control and dispersed to far-flung districts for garrison duty- Lahore had a garrison strength of 6,500 men, Peshawar of 3,000 men, Gobindgarh Fort 2,000 men, Hazara 3,000 men, Banner and Tonk 1,300 men, Attock 700 men, and Kohat 500 men. The remaining 3,000 men of the entire force were at numerous small posts throughout the Punjab.
The contingents of the Lahore army which joined the rebels were those of I Sahara Peshawar, Tonk and Bannu, Kohat, and Attock. 9,400 men, inclusive of the force of Shem Singh at Multan (900 infantry and 3,400 horse) . Allowing that 3,000 men stationed at various isolated places throughout the Punjab could get through and join the rebels in the north, the regular Sikh force could scarcely have exceeded 13,000 men and 9,000 horse. Disbanded Sikh soldiers and the freelance who flocked round the banner did not exceed 10,000 men. The disbanded soldiery merely augmented the numerical strength of the Khalsa; it had few generals and fewer arms and no means of procurement of arms and supplies. The total strength thus could not have been more than 23,000 men and 12,000 horse. Lord Gough crossed the Sutlej on 9 November and reached Lahore on 13 November. Moving rapidly into the Rachna Doab, he arrived at Ramnagar on 22 November. Sher Singh's entire force was on the right bank of the River Chenab. Brigadier-General Campbell with the 3rd Infantry Division (8,171 men) was ordered to move out to disperse the Sikh force in the vicinity of Ramnagar; Brigadier-General Cureton in command of the cavalry accompanied Campbell's force. On arrival at Ramnagar, Campbell found the Sikh force on the opposite side of the river. Cureton had numerous cavalry but no guns; he ordered the horse artillery under Colonel Lane to overtake the withdrawing Sikh troops through the sandy riverbed, but met with disaster. The Sikh artillery on the opposite bank opened up with disastrous effect, and Lane hastily withdrew the horse artillery leaving behind a heavy gun and two ammunition wagons, which the Sikhs captured. Suddenly, a column of the Sikh cavalry crossed the river under cover of artillery. The commander of the 14th Light Dragoons who led a squardon in support of Lane's horse artillery was shot dead. The charge failed and the British lost 90 officers and men including Brigadier-General Cureton and Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, and 140 horse. The action at Ramnagar was a victory for the Sikhs. Lord Dalhousie blamed both Campbell and Gough for the Assad affair" from which at here was no objective to be gained." Gough, on the other hand, claimed it as a victory. The enemy," he announced in a General Order, was signally overthrown on every occasion, and only saved from utter annihilation by their flight to the cover of their guns on the opposite bank."
For about a week after the British reverse, the two armies faced each other across the river. Lord Cough waited impatiently for the heavy guns o arrive. On 30 November, he detached a force under Major-General Thackwell across the river to take the Sikh army in the flank; another brigade of infantry under Brigadier Godby was ordered to ford the river 10 km from Ramnagar to support Thackwell's force. Across the river, at the principal ford 3 km from Ramnagar, Sher Singh's entire force, now risen to 12,000 men and 28 guns, lay strongly entrenched. Thackwell's force moved about 30 km up the river to Wazirabad and made the crossing, while Godby's brigade had crossed the river 25 km below. At midday on 3 December Thackwell arrived at Sadullapur barely 6 km from the Sikh encampment. The Sikhs realized the imminent danger to their flanks and rear. The heavy Sikh artillery opened fire at Thackwell's position, while the Sikh cavalry barred the passage of Godby's force which failed to join up with his troops. At dusk, the entire Sikh army crossed over to the left bank of the river. Sher Singh's action nullified the British maneuver; it also made it possible for Chatar Singh's force to join him. The British General claimed a victory without a battle. He reported a meagre loss of 4 men at Sadullapur, and claimed that the army under his command had upheld the tradition of valor. The Sikhs, he reported, were in full retreat, leaving behind some 60 boats which had been captured. In British military and political circles in England, Lord Gough was severely castigated for lack of drive and initiative. Lord Dalhousie openly charged him with incompetency and blamed him for incomplete actions and enormous losses. Under the shadow of these adverse strictures, Lord Gough fought the battle of Chillianwala on 13 January 1849. The Sikh army 12,000 strong was drawn in battle array in the dense jungle in front, their heavy guns bearing upon Chillianwala, on the River Jehlum. British preparations for encampment were rudely interrupted by sharp Sikh artillery fire. Lord Cough hesitated, but instantly drew up the order of the battle. In the centre were placed heavy 18-pounders and 8-inch howitzers; Major-General Gilbert's 2nd Infantry Division (5,248 men) was placed on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's 2nd Cavalry Brigade and 14th Light Dragoons and horse artillery. To the left was Brigadier-General Campbell's 3rd Infantry Division (8,171 men) flanked by White's 1st Cavalry Brigade and 3 troops of horse artillery.
The British guns started firing upon the Sikh centre. The density of the jungle made it impossible to preserve order and formation and the British brigades and regiments got separated from one another. The ground proved unsuitable for cavalry action, and the artillery failed to provide cover. Sikhs fought with determination and their artillery took a heavy toll. The British infantrymen were mowed down by fire from Sikh musketry, and the successive onslaughts of the Sikh ghorcharas broke the British cavalry line. While Campbell's charge failed to dislodge the Sikhs, the Khalsa horsemen swept the field like lightning raising vociferous Khalsa war cries.
In another direction, Brigadier Pennycuick's brigade moving in double time into the jungle, was routed by Sikh artillery. The brigade turned back to flee from the destructive fire of shot and shell leaving behind nearly half a regiment which faced total destruction. The most serious disaster befell Gilbert's division which halted in utter bewilderment when a large body of Sikhs surrounded the 2nd Infantry brigade. Gilbert's brigade had neither the cover of guns nor the support of cavalry. In the hand to hand fight, the brigade was repulsed and driven back with heavy loss. The battle lasted over three hours when Lord Gough ordered the whole army to retreat. British casualties in the action amounted to 2,446 men and 132 officers killed with four guns lost. The British Commander-in-chief claimed a victory, which claim the governor-general scornfully dubbed as "perhaps poetical." "We have gained a victory," he observed ruefully, "like that of the ancients; it is such a one that 'another such would ruin us.' " There was an outburst of popular indignation in England and Gough was squarely blamed for the defeat of the British. Military experts at home described him as a Superannuated general who could not mount his horse without assistance." It was decided to retire Lord Gough and replace him by Sir Charles Napier. In the meantime, however, Multan fell and Diwan Mul Raj surrendered to Major-General Whish on 22 January 1849. Lord Gough repaired his reputation in the battle of Gujrat fought on 21 February 1849. The Sikh army had regrouped on the banks of the Jehlum. On 15 February, it arrived at Gujrat where Chatar Singh's force and an Afghan contingent of 3,000 horse under Akram Khan encircled the town. On 13 February, Major-General Whish's 1st Division (13,400 men and 30 pieces of heavy artillery joined the British force. The Bombay column (12,100 men and 3,000 cavalry) joined a few days later. Thus assured of an overwhelming superiority of men and heavy artillery, Lord Gough ordered the entire force forward and reaching a few days later Shadival, a village 8 km from Gujrat, he found himself face to face with the Sikhs.
The battle of Gujrat must be reckoned as one of the most notable in the annals of British warfare in India. Never, perhaps, the British had amassed so many guns and men in any single battle. The British army now consisted of 56,636 men four infantry divisions, 11,569 horse, 96 field-guns, and 67 siege-guns including ten 18-pounders and six 8-inch howitzers drawn by elephants. For this obvious reason the battle of Gujrat has often been described as "the battle of guns.
On the morning of 21 February, the whole British army advanced with the precision of a parade movement. The Sikh guns opened fire, thus disclosing their positions and range. The British General brought the three divisions to a sudden halt and ordered the whole line of artillery to fire. The sustained cannonade of 100 guns, the fire of 18-pounders and 8-inch howitzers, which continued for two hours blunted Sikh artillery. When the British guns had spent up their fury, their infantry line advanced rapidly. The Sikh infantry positions were Captured, and the Sikhs driven out of cover. The battle was over within a few hours. The advance of the whole British line completely overwhelmed the Sikhs and they fled the field in confusion. Their loss was estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 men and 53 guns the British casualties were 96 killed and 700 wounded. "The Sikhs," commented Lord Dalhousie, "displayed the skill, courage and activity which belong to their race. " With the decisive British victory at Gujrat the hostilities ended on 11 March 1849. Sher Singh and Chatar Singh formally surrendered their swords to Major-General Gilbert near Rawalpindi. They were followed on the 14th by the whole Sikh army. "Today is Ranjit Singh dead," sighed the soldiers as they kissed their swords and laid them down on the ever-enlarging heap of steel. Lord Dalhousie proclaimed annexation of the Punjab on 29 March 1849. His foreign secretary, Henry Meirs Elliot, arrived at Lahore to obtain the signatures of the members of the Council of Regency and of the minor king, Maharaja Duleep Singh. A darbar was held in the Lahore Fort and, with the British troops lined up on his right and his helpless sardars on his left, the young Duleep Singh affixed his signatures to the document which deprived him of his crown and kingdom.  



First Anglo Sikh War

First Anglo Sikh War 1845-46 A.D.


ANGLO-SIKH WAR 1, 1845-46, resulting in partial subjugation of the Sikh kingdom, as the outcome of British expansionism. It was near-anarchical conditions that overtook the Lahore court after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in June 1839. The English, by then firmly installed in Firozpur the Sikh frontier, about 70 km from ahore, the Sikh capital, were watching the happenings across the border with more than neighbour's interest The disorder that revailed there promised them a good oppurtunity for direct intervention.
Up to 1838, the British troops on the Sikh frontier had amounted to one regiment at Sabathu in the hills and two at Ludhiana with six pieces of artillery, equalling in all about 2,500 men. The total rose to 8,000 during the time of Lord Auckland (1836 42) who increased the number of troops at Ludhiana and created a new military post at Firozpur, which was actually Past of Sikh kingdom's dominion south of the Sutlej. British preparations for a war with the Sikhs began seriously in 1843 when the new governor-general, Lord Ellenborough (1842-44), discussed with the Home government the possibilities of a military occupation of the Punjab. English and Indian infantry reinforcement began arriving at each of the frontier posts of Firozpur and Ludhiana. Cavalry and artillery regiments moved up to Ambala and Kasauli. Works were in the process of erection around the magazine at Firozpur, and the fort at Ludhiana began to he fortified. Plans for the construction of bridges over the rivers Markanda and Ghaggar were prepared, and a new road link to join Meerut and Ambala was taken in hand. Exclusive of the newly constructed cantonments of Kasauli and Shimla, Ellenborough had been able to collect a force of 11,639 men and 48 guns at Ambala, Ludhiana and Firozpur. Everywhere," wrote Lord Ellenborough, we are trying to get things in order and especially to strengthen and equip the artillery with which the fight will be."
Seventy boats of thirty-five tons each, with the necessary equipments to bridge the Sutlej at any point, were under construction; fifty-six pontoons were on their way from Bombay for use in Sindh, and two steamers were being constructed to ply on the River Sutlej. in November 1845," he informed the Duke of Wellington, "the army will be equal to any operation. I should be sorry to have it called to the field sooner." In July 1844, Lord Ellenborough was replaced by Lord Hardinge (1844-48), a Peninsula veteran, as governor-general of India. Hardinge further accelerated the process of strengthening the Sutlej frontier for a war with the Sikhs. The affable Colonel Richmond was replaced by the abrasive and belligerent Major George Broadfoot as the political agent on the Punjab frontier. Lord Cough, the commander-in-chief, established his headquarters at Ambala. In October 1844, the British military force on the frontier was 17,000 infantry and 60 guns. Another 10,000 troops were to be ready by the end of November. Firozpur's garrison strength under the command of Sir John Littler was raised to 7,000; by January 1845, the total British force amounted to 20,000 men and 60 guns. We can collect," Hardinge reported to the Home government, 33,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 100 guns in six weeks." In March additional British and Indian regiments were quietly moved to Flrozpur, Ludhiana and Ambala. Field batteries of 9 pounders with horses or bullocks to draw them, and 24 additional pieces of heavy ordnance were on their way to the frontier. In addition, 600 elephants to draw the battering train of 24-pounder batteries had reached Agra, and 7,000 camels between Kanpur and the Sutlej were to move up in the summer to Firozpur, which was to be the concentration point for a forward offensive movement.
Lord Hardinge, blamed unnecessarily by the Home government for inadequate military preparations for the first Sikh war, had, during the seventeen months between Ellen borough's departure and the commencement of hostilities with the Sikhs, increased the garrison strength at Ferozpur from 4,596 men and 12 guns to 10,472 men and 24 guns; at Ambala from 4,113 men and 24 guns to 12, 972 men and 32 guns; at Ludhiana from 3,030 men and 12 guns to 7,235 men and 12 guns, and at Meerut from 5,573 men and 18 guns to 9,844 men and 24 guns. The relevant strength of the advanced armies, including those at the hill stations of Sabathu and Kasauli, was raised from 24,000 men and 66 guns to 45,500 men and 98 guns. These figures are based on official British papers, particularly Hardinge's private correspondence on Punjab affairs with his predecessor, Lord Ellenborough. Thus Total number of British troops around Punjab were 86,023 men and 116 guns. In addition to the concentration of troops on the border, an elaborate supply depot was set up by the British at Basslan, near Raikot, in Ludhianz district. The Lahore Darbar's vamps or representatives and newswriters in the cis-Sutlej region sent alarming reports of these large-scale British military movements across the border. The Sikhs were deeply wrought upon by these war preparations, especially by Broadfoot's acts of hostility. The rapid march in November 1845 of the governor-general towards the frontier and a report of Sir Charles Napier's speech in the Delhi Gazette saying that the British were going to war with the Sikhs filled Lahore with rumours of invasion. The Sikh ranks, alerted to the danger of a British offensive, started their own preparations. Yet the army panches or regimental representatives, who had taken over the affairs of the Lahore forces into their own hands after the death of Wazir Jawahar Singh, were at this time maintaining, according to George Campbell, a British civilian employed in the cis-Sutlej territory,Memoirs of My Indian Career , "Wonderful order at Lahore.. and almost puritanical discipline in the military republic."
However, the emergence of the army Panchayats as a new centre of power greatly perturbed the British authority who termed it as "unholy alliance between the republican army and the Darbar." In this process Sikh army had indeed been transformed. It had now assumed the role of theKhalsa. It worked through elected regimental commitees declaring that Guru Gobind Singh's ideal of the Sikh commonwealth had been revived, with theSarbatt Khalsa or the Sikh as a whole assuming all executive, military and civil authority in the State. The British decried this as "the dangerous military democracy of the panchayat system," in which soldiers were in a state of success mutiny. " When the British agent made a referenece the Lahore Darbar about military preparations in the Punjab, it replied that there only defensive measures to counter the signs of the British. The Darbar, on other hand, asked for the return of the estimated at over seventeen lakh of the Lahore grandee Suchet Singh had left buried in Firozpur, the restoration of the village of Mauran granted by Maharaja Ranjit Singh to one of his generals Hukam Singh Malvai, but subsequently resumed by the ruler of Nabha with the active connivance of the British, and free passage of Punjabi armed constabulary, a right that had been acknowledged by the British on paper but more often than not in practice. The British government rejected the Darbar's claims and severed diplomatic relations with it. The armies under Hugh Gough and Lord Hardinge began proceeding towards Firozpur. To forestall their joining those at Firozpur, the Sikh army began to cross the Sutlej on 11 December near Harike Pattan into its own territory on the other side of the river. The crossing over the Sutlej by Sikhs was made a pretext by the British for opening hostilities and on 13 December Governor-General Lord Hardinge issued a proclamation announcing war on the Sikhs. The declaration charged the State of Lahore with violation of the treaty of friendship of 1809 and justified British preparations as merely precautionary measures for the protection of the Sutlej frontier. The British simultaneouly declared Sikh possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej forfeit.
Hesitation and indecision marred Sikh military operations. Having crossed the Sutlej with five divisions, each 8,000 - 12,000 strong, an obvious strategy for them would have been to move forward. They did in a bold sweeps ing movement first encircle Firozpur, then held by Sir John Littler with only 7,000 men, but withdrew without driving the advantage home and dispersed their armies in a wide semicircle from Harike to Mudki and thence to Ferozeshah, 16 km southeast of Firozpur. The abandonment of Firozpur as a firstt target was the result of the treachery of the Sikh prime minister, Lal Singh, who was in treasonable communication with Captain Peter Nicholson, the assistant political agent of the British. He asked the latter's advice and was told not to attack Firozpur. This instruction he followed seducing the Sikhs with an ingenious excuse that, instead of falling upon an easy prey, the Khalsa should exalt their fame by captivity or the death of the Lat Sahib (the governor general) himself A division precipitately moved towards Ludhiana also remained inactive long enough to lose the benefit of the initiative The Khalsa army had crossed the Sutlej borne on a wave of popular enthusiasm, it was equally matched(60000 Sikh soldiers vs. 86,000 British soldiers) if not superior to the British force. Its soldiers had the will and determination to fight or die, but not its commanders. There was no uniq among them, and each of them seemed to act as he thought best. Drift was the policy deliberately adopted by them. On 18 December, the Sikhs came in touch with British army which arrived under Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, from Ludhiana. A battle took place at Mudki, 32 km from Flrozpur. Lal Singh, who headed the Sikh attack, deserted his army and fled the field when the Sikhs stood firm in their order, fighting in a resolute and determined manner. The leaderless Sikhs fought a grim hand-to-hand battle against the more numerous enemy led by the most experienced commanders in the world. The battle continued with unabated fury till midnight (and came thereafter to be known as "Midnight Mudki"). The Sikhs retired with a loss of 17 guns while the British suffered heavy casualities amounting to 872 killed and wounded, including Quartermaster-General Sir Robert Sale, SirJohn McCaskill and Brigadier Boulton. Reinforcements were sent for from Ambala, Meerut and Delhi. Lord Hardinge, unmindful of his superior position of governor-general, offered to become second-in-command to his commander-in-chief.
The second action was fought three days later, on 21 December at Ferozeshah, 16 km both from Mudki and Firozpur. The governor-general and the commander-in-chief, assisted by reinforcements led by General Littler from Firozpur, made an attack upon the Sikhs who were awaiting them behind strong entrenchments. The British, 16,700 men and 69 guns tried to overrun the Sikhs in one massive cavalry, infantry and artillery onslaught, but the assault was stubbornly resisted. Sikhs' batteries fired with rapidity and precision. There was confusion in the ranks of the English and their position became increasingly critical. The growing darkness of the frosty winter night reduced them to sore straits. The battle of Ferozeshah is regarded as one of the most fiercely contested battles fought by the British in India. During that "night of horrors," the commander-in-chief acknowledged, "we were in a critical and perilous state." Counsels of retreat and surrender were raised and despair struck the British camp. In the words of Ceneral Sir ISope Grant, Sir Henry Hardinge thought it was all up and gave his sword,a present from the Duke of Wellington and which once belonged to Napoleon and his Star of the ISath to his son, with directions to proceed to Firozpur, remarking that "if the day were lost, he must fall . "
Lal Singh and Tej Singh again came to the rescue of the English. The former suddenly deserted the Khalsa army during the night and the latter the next morning (22 December) which enabled the British to turn defeat into victory. The British loss was again heavy, 1,560 killed and 1,721 wounded. The number of casualities among officers was comparatively higller. The Sikhs lost about 2,000 men and 73 pieces of artillery.
A temporary cessation of hostilities followecl the battle of Ferozeshah. The English were not in a position to assume the offensive and waited for heavy guns and reinforcements to arrive from Delhi. Lal Singh and Tej Singh allowed them the much needed respite in as much as they kept the Sikhs from recrossing the Sutlej. To induce desertions, Lord Hardinge issued a proclamation on the Christmas day inviting all natives of Hindustan to quit the service of the Sikh State on pain of forfeiting their property and to claim protection from the British government. The deserters were also offered liberal rewards and pensions.
A Sikh sardar, Ranjodh Singh Majlthia, crossed the Sutlej in force and was joined by Ajit Singh, of Ladva, from the other side of the river. They marched towards Ludhiana and burnt a portion of the cantonment. Sir Harry Smith (afterwards Governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to relieve Ludhlana, marched eastwards from Firozpur, keeping a few miles away from the Sutlej. Ranjodh Singh Majithia harried Smith's column and, when Smith tried to make a detour at Baddoval, attacked his rear with great vigour and captured his baggage train and stores (21 January). But Harry Smith retrieved his position a week later by inflicting a defeat on Ranjodh Singh Majithia and Ajlt Singh, of Ladva, (28January).
The last battle of the campaign took place on 10 February. To check the enemy advance on Lahore, a large portion of the Sikh army was entrenched in a horse-shoe curve on the Sutlej near the village of Sabhraon, under the command of Tej Singh while the cavalry battalions and the dreaded ghorcharas under Lal Singh were a little higher up the river. Entrenchments at Sabhraon were on the left bank of the Sutlej with a pontoon bridge connecting them with their base camp. Their big guns were placed behind high embankments and consequently immobilized for offensive action. The infantry was also posted behind earthworks and could not, therefore, be deployed to harass the opponents.
Early in February, the British received ample stores of ammunition from Delhi. Lal Singh had already passed on to the English officers the required clues for an effective assault. Gough and Hardinge now decided to make a frontal attack on Sabhraon and destory the Darbar army at one blow. A heavy mist hung over the battlefield, enveloping both contending armies. As the sun broke through the mist, the Sikhs found themselves encircled between two horse-shoes: facing them were the British and behind them was the Sutlej, now in spate. After a preliminary artillery duel, British cavalry made a feint to check on the exact location of the Sikh guns. The cannonade was resumed, and in two hours British guns put the Darbar artillery out of action. Then the British charged Sikh entrenchments from three sides. Tej Singh fled across the pontoon bridge as soon as the contest started and had it destroyed making reinforcement or return of Sikh soldiers impossible. Gulab Singh Dogra stopped sending supplies and rations from Lahore. Lal Singh's ghorcharas did not put in their appearance at Sabhraon. In the midst of these treacheries, a Sikh warrior, Sham Singh Attarivala, symbolizing the unflinching will of the Khalsa, vowed to fight unto the last and fall in battle rather than retire in defeat. He rallied the ranks depleted by desertions. His courage inspired the Sikhs to make a determined bid to save the day, but the odds were against them. Sham Singh fell fighting in the foremost ranks along with his dauntless comrades. The British casualties at Sabhraon were 2,403 killed; the Sikhs lost 3,125 men in the action and all their guns were either captured or abandoned in the river. Captain J.D. Cunningham, who was present as an additional aide-de-camp to the governor-general, describes the last scene of the battle vividly in his A History of the Sikhs: "...although assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh offered to submit, and no disciple of Guru Gobind Singh asked for quarter. They everywhere showed a front to the victors, and stalked slowly and sullenly away, while many rushed singly forth to meet assured death by contending with a multitude. The victors looked with stolid wonderment upon the indomitable courage of the vanquished."
Lord Hugh Gough, the British commander-in-chief, under whose leadership the two Anglo-Sikh wars were fought, described Sabhraon as the Waterloo of India. Paying tribute to the gallantry of the Sikhs, he said: "Policy precluded me publicly recording my sentiments on the splendid gallantry of our fallen foe, or to record the acts of heroism displayed, not only individually, but almost collectively, by the Sikh sardars and the army; and I declare were it not from a deep conviction that my country's good required the sacrifice, I could have wept to have witnessed the fearful slaughter of so devoted a body of men."
Lord Hardinge, who saw the action, wrote: " Few escaped; none, it may be said, surrendered. The Sikhs met their fate with the resignation which distinguishes their race.
Two days after their victory at Sabhraon, British forces crossed the Sutlej and occupied Kasur. The Lahore Darbar empowered Gulab Singh Dogra, who had earlier come down to Lahore with regiments of hillmen, to negotiate a treaty of peace. Thc wily Gulab Singh first obtained assurances from the army Parishes that they would agree to the terms he made and then tendered the submission of the darbar to Lord Hardinge. The governor-general, realizing that the Sikhs were far from vanquished, forbore from immediate occupation of the country. By the terms imposed by the victorious British through the peace treaty of 9 March, the Lahore Darbar was compelled to give up Jalandhar Doab, pay a war indemnity amounting to a million and a half sterling, reduce its army to 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, hand over all the guns used in the war and relinquish control of both banks of the Sutlej to the British. A further condition was added two days later on 11 March: the posting of a British unit in Lahore till the end of the year on payment of expenses. The Darbar was unable to pay the full war indemnity and ceded in lieu thereof the hill territories between the Beas and the Indus. Kashmir was sold to Gulab Singh Dogra for 75 lakh rupees. A week later, on 16 March, another treaty was signed at Amritsar recognizing him as Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, affirming the suspicion that Gulab Singh Dogra indeed was involved in sedition against Khalsa Sarkar. Although Maharani Jind Kaur continued to act as the regent and Raja Lal Singh as water of the minor Maharaja Duleep Singh, effective power had passed into the hands of the British resident, Colonel Henry Lawrence. And thus end the First Anglo-Sikh war..


First Anglo Afghan War

First Anglo Afghan War 1839-42 A.D.


Until January 1842, the idea that an unorganised band of Afghan hillmen could have defeated the mighty Anglo-Indian Army would have been considered absurd. Yet, on the 13th of that month, when the lone and ravaged figure of Dr William Brydon arrived at Jalalabad, he brought with him the news that would destroy the myth of British invincibility in Central Asia. His story was a sinister portent of things to come, and it would leave the authorities in London and Calcutta scrabbling desperately for explanations.
By the 1830s, after the fall of Napoleonic France, Russia had emerged as Britain’s predominant imperial rival. Competition between the two states for power and influence in Central Asia would give rise to a ‘Great Game’ of wars, intrigue, and espionage that would continue into the first decades of the 20th century.
India was the Jewel in the Crown of the British Empire, providing a seemingly infinite flow of wealth and power for its imperial masters: a prize the Tsars sought for themselves. From the sea, the subcontinent was impenetrable, access to it blocked by British naval supremacy. Any successful invasion would have to come by land. Russian expansion into Central Asia and increasing influence in Iran’s foreign policy threatened to open a route through which to strike southwards at the soft underbelly of British India.
Afghanistan, a seemingly insignificant, fragmented, and impoverished tribal society held the key to the two nations’ ambitions in Asia. The British were uninterested in incorporating Afghanistan into their empire. Rather, the government saw Afghanistan as a buffer zone between their possessions in India and an ever-encroaching Russia. If Cossack and Sepoy were to meet in battle, it was best done as far from India as possible.
In 1837, an envoy in the form of William Burnes was sent to the court of Dost Muhammad Khan, Afghanistan’s emir, to secure an alliance against Russia. Muhammad agreed in principle, but with the proviso that Britain should help the Afghans regain control of Peshawar from the princes of Lahore.
Lahore lay on the border of India and was one of Britain’s more fragile allies in the subcontinent. It was not a state the British were willing to alienate. Consequently, the negotiations with Dost Muhammad failed. And further to this, as far as the British were concerned, he would have to be removed.
Shah Shuja had ruled Afghanistan from 1803 to 1809, before being deposed by Dost Muhammad. The suggestion now was that he should be reinstalled on the Afghan throne. As early as 1831, Shah Shuja had let it be known that if he were in power, he would happily open Afghanistan’s trade routes to the British. Shuja would, to all intents and purposes, sit as the puppet ruler of an Anglo-friendly buffer zone.
In October 1838, the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, issued a manifesto outlining the reasons for British intervention in Afghanistan. The official line was that British troops would be present in Afghanistan merely to support Shah Shuja’s army in retaking what was rightfully his. Once he was firmly installed in Kabul, British troops would leave the country.
Invasion

The invasion began in December 1838, when an army totalling 39,000 men left the Punjab and entered Afghanistan. With them travelled William Hay Macnaghten who was to be the British Chief Representative in Kabul. The harsh Afghan climate and rugged landscape was soon telling on the Anglo-Indian troops as they trudged deeper into the country. Nevertheless, by 25 April they had arrived at Kandahar, resistance having melted away, and Shah Shuja, flanked by his British allies, entered the traditional seat of his ruling dynasty to a joyous reception.
The capture of Kandahar was swiftly followed by the storming of the ‘impregnable’ fortress of Ghanzi and the decisive rout of Dost Muhammad’s army. In August of 1839, Shah Shuja entered Kabul and once again became ruler of Afghanistan.
That should have been it. Shah Shuja and his British allies had achieved what appeared to be a remarkable victory. Not for the last time, the invaders of Afghanistan were beguiled by an initial easy triumph. For in fact, the scene had been set for a catastrophic defeat that would shatter British prestige and drive them out of Afghanistan for a generation.
Shah Shuja’s government was immediately unpopular. He appointed corrupt officials and surrounded himself with cronies, excluding traditional tribal leaders and denying them the standing and influence they felt their position deserved. This was a critical blunder. For the loyalties of the Afghan population were towards their tribal kinsmen rather than to any central government.
Added to this, Shah Shuja, re-emerging from years of exile spent in the comparatively cosmopolitan and liberal atmosphere of British India, bought with him a moral code that many Afghans found highly distasteful. The presence of a foreign army – and the debauchery that came with it – did little to help the situation. Of particular notoriety was the assistant envoy, now Sir Alexander Burnes, whose womanising and raucous behaviour were renowned throughout Kabul.
On the surface, Afghanistan appeared peaceful, and the British began to fulfil their promise of returning to India. The first troops went home before the year was out, leaving only 8,000 men to prop up the Shah. The presence of British troops in the city may not have been liked, but it was tolerated on the assumption that it was temporary.
The tide of opinion began to turn when Macnaghten allowed the British soldiers’ families to join them, in the hope of improving moral. To the local population, the message seemed clear: the British were to become a permanent fixture. In the British cantonment in Kabul, it was as if a small piece of British India had been transplanted to Afghan soil. Cocktail parties and dog shows were held in blissful ignorance of the forces stirring beyond the imperial enclave. For the mood of the Afghan people had become restless.
Rebellion

Between April and September 1840, the British suffered their first serious setback. The garrison at Kahan was besieged by disaffected rebels. Its supply-train was carried off, and a relief force beaten back. In September, with supplies exhausted, the garrison surrendered. As a mark of respect for their brave stand, the British were allowed to leave un-harassed with their weapons. This act of clemency would not be repeated.
The general election of 1841 saw a sea-change back in London, with the Conservatives displacing the Whigs. The incoming government was determined to cut expenditure on Afghanistan. Anglo-Indian troop numbers were to be drawn down. They were to be replaced with a doubling in number of Shah Shuja’s own Afghan forces. The amount of money paid in bribes to tribal chiefs, including the Ghilzais who controlled the route between Kabul and Jalalabad, was to be drastically reduced.
The effects were immediate: Sir Robert Sale’s brigade had to fight its way from Kabul to Jalalabad, losing 105 men. Then, on 2 November, an angry crowd gathered outside Alexander Burnes’ residence in Kabul, protesting against his decadent behaviour. He was killed along with his brother and a fellow officer as they tried to escape the scene in disguise.
British reaction to the killings was typical of the entire campaign. Major-General William Elphistone, who was now in command of military operations in Afghanistan, failed to act. The population, accustomed to swift and merciless reprisals, anxiously awaited the authorities’ response. Now was the moment to nip rebellion in the bud.
But nothing happened, and the fact that British envoys could be killed with impunity set a dangerous precedent. Two factors contributed to the lack of action. Firstly, as a commander, Elphistone was over the hill. He had served with great distinction at Waterloo, but that was a generation ago, and he was now old, in poor health, and tired of soldiering. Secondly, the small, isolated British force saw their role in Kabul as supportive or advisory, and they were keen to leave civil security to Shah Shujah, lest they appear as an occupying army. The two combined to create confusion and paralysis, with orders being issued and then repealed, resulting in nothing but a display of weakness. The failure of Shujah to suppress the unrest also showed him up as an ineffective ruler.
Having lost all credibility, the British forces now found themselves effectively under siege in their cantonment, with sporadic incoming fire from the surrounding hills. Negotiations began on 25 November with the bitter Afghan winter already setting in. Macnaghten’s demand that the British should not have dishonourable terms imposed upon them fell on deaf ears. The hawks in the Afghan court were now in the driving seat: buoyed up by a swelling insurgency, they had no need to grant concessions.
Just as it appeared negotiations were stalling, a message came form Akbar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad: in exchange for being made wazir (effectively ruler of the country), he would support the Shah, allow the British to remain outside Kabul, and round up some of the rebel leaders. MacNaghten jumped at the deal and, against advice, went out to meet Khan. It soon became clear that the deal was bait to draw the British representative into the open. He was surrounded and killed. His body was then dragged around the market before being dismembered and hung on the gates.
Retreat from Kabul

The situation was now dire. The British had no choice but to return to India. On 1 January 1842, the retreat from Kabul began. Some 4,500 soldiers with nine field guns, accompanied by around 12,000 camp-followers, began the slow march to safety.
From the start, what little order there was went awry. As pillaging Afghans moved into the emptying cantonment, panic ran through the straggling camp-followers, causing a stampede and the abandonment much of the stores.
From this point on, the chain of command was broken. It was every man for himself. The first day’s march took the column five miles before it made a disorganised camp for the night. Sunrise revealed the toll inflicted by the cold as frozen bodies were abandoned where they lay. As the march resumed, the column was harassed constantly by Afghan horsemen passing at will through the loose ranks. From the high ground, irregulars sniped at the British below with their long jezail rifles. The British, equipped with muskets designed for short-range volley fire, were unable to reply.
The column continued to the Tangi Tariki Pass, where the Ghilzais had blocked the road. Most of the column was annihilated by the raiders lying in wait. The rearguard was totally wiped out. Only Elphistone, his staff, 100 cavalrymen, less that half the 44th Foot, and handful of artillerymen made it through. Khan sent a message to Elphistone inviting him to his camp. Elphistone accepted, hoping to discuss terms, but on arrival found he was now the warlord’s prisoner.
Command devolved to Brigadier Anquetil who hoped to use the cover of darkness to slip by the waiting Ghilzais. He found his away again blocked, forcing the infantrymen to make a last desperate stand at Gandamak. Captain Soulter of the 44th was spared death only because he was mistaken for a great chief due to the fine attire he was wearing. He had in fact wrapped the silken regimental colour around himself to avoid it falling into enemy hands. All of his comrades perished.
One sole Briton made it to Jalalabad. Our portent of ill omen, Dr Brydon, approached the city on a dying horse, followed by a few sepoy stragglers, to tell the tale of the army’s destruction.
Retaliation

The myth of British invincibility had been shattered. In Kabul, on the other hand, Shah Shuja’s regime might have benefited from his ally’s defeat. With the foreign presence gone, one of the major causes of unrest was removed. Soon after, however, Shuja was assassinated. A scramble for power between rival factions followed. After much bloodshed, terms were reached: one of Shah Shuja’s sons would be placed on the throne with Akbar Khan as his wazir.
Desiring a swift end to the conflict, Ellenborough, who was now Govenor General of India, ordered a full withdrawal from Afghanistan after British military prestige had been restored by a battlefield victory. For this, two armies were sent into Afghanistan, under Generals Nott and Pollock. Akbar Khan met Pollock en route, but was defeated and forced to withdraw.
Ellenborough had at first been reluctant to see the generals advance as far as Kabul, but now he ordered them on, with the injunction that they should inflict just, but not vindictive, reprisals, and that they should reclaim British hostages and captured guns and colours. This Nott and Pollock did. The settlements of men suspected of being party to the uprising were attacked. In Kabul, the great market was destroyed as belated retaliation for Macnaghton’s killing. From Bamiyan, to which they had been transferred, the hostages were freed.
On the 12 October, satisfied that imperial prestige had been restored, the British left Kabul. With Shah Shuja’s successor unwilling to retake control, another of his sons was placed on the throne. It was not long, however, before Akhbar Khan had him removed, making room for his father, Dost Muhammad, to return from exile and retake his throne.
The British intervention had been a total disaster. The old regime, conservative and independent, had been restored, and both government and population inside Afghanistan were now resolutely anti-British.
The war had been a military and political failure. Could it have ended otherwise? From the start, the British backed the wrong man. The fact that Shah Shuja had already lost his throne once should have been proof enough that he was an unpopular, corrupt, and incompetent ruler.
A fundamental misunderstanding of the Afghan way of life entirely undermined the British strategy. Afghanistan was not India. It was not like the vast Mughal and Maratha empires, centralised autocracies that could be brought crashing down to total ruin in a single campaign. Only with the support of the local tribal chiefs could Afghanistan be ruled, support that the Shah and his foreign allies wholly failed to secure.
Once in Kabul, the British were unwilling to consolidate with strong support for the regime they had installed. Instead, the small force left in the city found itself without a clear-cut role: it was loathe to interfere with the Shah’s rule, yet it lacked the strength to crush any serious rebellion he might face. It was effective neither as consultant nor policeman.
Ineffective leadership by Elphistone and infighting among his staff led to a collapse of command and control, culminating in the panic and chaos of the final retreat.
It would be nearly 40 years before Britain would have the stomach to become involved again in Afghan affairs. As in 1839, it would be tensions with Russia and Kabul that would bring Anglo-Indian troops marching up the Khyber Pass. This Second Afghan War (1878-1880) will be the subject of the second article in our monthly mini-series on British military interventions in Afghanistan.


First Anglo Burmese War


Important wars and battles in Indian History

First Anglo Burmese War 1824-26 A.D.



 5 March 1824 – 24 February 1826) was the first of three wars fought between the British and Burmese empires in the 19th century. The war, which began primarily over the control of Northeastern India, ended in a decisive British victory, giving the British total control of Assam, Manipur, Cachar and Jaintiaas well as Arakan Province and Tenasserim. The Burmese were also forced to pay an indemnity of one million pounds sterling, and sign a commercial treaty.
Fifteen thousand European and Indian soldiers died, together with an unknown number of Burmese military and civilian casualties. The high cost of the campaign to the British, 5–13 million pounds sterling (£375 million-£976 million as of 2016 contributed to a severe economic crisis in British India which cost the East India Company its remaining privileges.
For the Burmese Empire, it was the beginning of the end of their independence. The Third Burmese Empire, for a brief time the terror of British India, was crippled and no longer a threat to the eastern frontier of British India. The Burmese would be crushed for years to come by repaying the large indemnity of one million pounds (then US$5 million), a large sum at that time. The British would wage two more wars against a much-weakened Burma, and swallow up the entire country by 1885.
Causes
By 1822, Burmese expansion into Manipur and Assam had created a long border between British India and the Burmese Empire. The British, based in Calcutta, supported rebels from Manipur, Assam and Arakan fleeing into British territory. Calcutta unilaterally declared Cachar and Jaintia British protectorates, and sent in troops. Cross border raids into these newly acquired territories from British territories and spheres of influence vexed the Burmese. Convinced that war was inevitable, Burmese commander-in-chief, Maha Bandula, became a main proponent of offensive policy against the British. Bandula was part of the war party at Bagyidaw's court, which also included Queen Me Nu and her brother, the Lord of Salin.  Bandula believed that a decisive victory could allow Ava to consolidate its gains in its new western empire in Arakan, Manipur, Assam, Cachar and Jaintia, as well as take over eastern Bengal.
In September 1823, the casus belli was Burma occupying Shalpuri Island near Chittagong, which was claimed by the East India Company.[7]
In January 1824, Burma sent one of their top generals, Thado Thiri Maha Uzana, into Cachar and Jaintia to disperse the rebels. The British sent in their own force to meet the Burmese in Cachar, resulting in the first clashes between the two. The war formally broke out on 5 March 1824, following border clashes in Arakan.
The British reason for the war was, in addition to expanding British Bengal's sphere of influence, the desire for new markets for British manufacturing.  The British were also anxious to deny the French the use of Burmese harbours and concerned about French influence at the Court of Ava, as the kingdom was still known to them.  British Ambassador Michael Symes's mission was equipped to
gain as much knowledge as possible of the country for future British plans whereas previous envoys were concerned principally with trade concessions. Anglo–French rivalry had already played a role during Alaungpaya's endeavours of unifying the kingdom.  The Burmese in these wars were advancing into smaller states not ruled by the British or the subject of expansionary goals by the British before the war began, and the British were not so much preoccupied by the refugee problem initially as by the threat posed by the French until further incidents forced their hand.
War
Western Theatre
 The commander in chief of the Burmese army, Maha Bandula, was supported by twelve of the country's best divisions, including one under his personal command, all totaling 10,000 men and 500 horses. His general staff included some of the country's most decorated soldiers, men like the Lord of Salay and the governors of Danyawaddy, Wuntho and Taungoo. Bandula's plan was to attack the British on two fronts:Chittagong from Arakan in the southeast, and Sylhet from Cachar and Jaintia in the north.  Bandula personally commanded the Arakan theatre while Uzana commanded Cachar and Jaintia theater.
Early in the war, battle hardened Burmese forces were able to push back the British forces because the Burmese, who had been fighting in the jungles of Manipur and Assam for nearly a decade, were more familiar with the terrain which represented "a formidable obstacle to the march of a European force". Uzana had already defeated the British units in Cachar and Jaintia in January 1824. In May, Burmese forces led by U Sa, Lord Myawaddy (about 4,000)  fought their way into Bengal, and defeated British troops at the Battle of Ramu, 10 miles east of Cox's Bazar on 17 May 1824  Sa's column then joined Bandula's column on the march to defeat British forces at Gadawpalin, and went on to capture Cox's Bazar. The Burmese success caused extreme panic in Chittagong and in Calcutta.  Across the eastern Bengal, the European inhabitants formed themselves into militia forces. And a large portion of the crews of the East India Company's ships were landed to assist in the defence of Calcutta.
 But Bandula, not wanting to overstretch, stopped U Sa from proceeding to Chittagong. Had Bandula marched on to Chittagong, which unbeknown to him was lightly held, he could have taken it and the way to Calcutta would have been open. Had they been able to threaten Calcutta, the Burmese could have obtained more favourable terms in the peace negotiations later on.

Battle of Yangon (May–December 1824)

Instead of fighting in hard terrain, the British took the fight to the Burmese mainland. On 11 May 1824, a British naval force of over 10,000 men (5,000 British soldiers and over 5,000 Indian sepoys) entered the harbour of Yangon, taking the Burmese by surprise. The Burmese, pursuing a scorched earth policy, left an empty city behind and chose to fortify positions along an east-west 10-mile arc outside the city. The British forces led by General Archibald Campbell took position inside a fortified Shwedagon Pagoda compound. The British launched attacks on Burmese lines, and by July 1824, had successfully pushed the Burmese towards Kamayut, five miles from Shwedagon. Burmese efforts to retake Shwedagon in September failed.
King Bagyidaw ordered a near complete withdrawal from the western front—Bandula from Arakan and Bengal, and Uzana from Assam, Cachar and Jaintia—and meet the enemy in Yangon. In August, in the midst of monsoon season, Bandula and his army crossed the Arakan Yoma. Moving tens of thousands of men over the 3,000-foot-high Arakan hills, or 10,000-foot-high Assamese ranges, heavily forested with only narrow footpaths and open to attack by tigers and leopards, would be difficult even in mild weather conditions. To do this at the height of the drenching monsoon season was a particularly difficult task. Yet Bandula (from Arakan) and Uzana (from Assam) in a testament to their generalship and logistical skills, managed to do just that. The King granted both Bandula and Uzana the title Agga Maha Thenapati, the highest possible military rank. Bandula was also made the governor of Sittaung.
By November, Bandula commanded a force of 30,000 massed outside Yangon. Bandula believed that he could take on a well-armed British force of 10,000 head-on. Although the Burmese were numerically superior, only 15,000 of the 30,000 had muskets. The Burmese cannons fired only balls whereas the British cannons fired exploding shells. Unbeknown to him, the British had just received the first shipment of the newest weapon in war that the Burmese had never seen—Congreve rockets. More ominous for the Burmese, the speedy march through the hilly regions of Rakhine Yoma and Assamese ranges had left their troops exhausted.
On 30 November, in what turned out be the biggest mistake of his career, Bandula ordered a frontal attack on British positions. The British, with far superior weaponry, withstood several Burmese charges at the Shwedagon fort, cutting down men by the thousands. By 7 December, the British troops, supported by rocket fire, had begun to gain the upper hand. On 15 December, the Burmese were driven out of their last remaining stronghold at Kokine. In the end, only 7,000 of the 30,000 Burmese soldiers returned.

Battle of Danubyu (March–April 1825)

Bandula fell back to his rear base at Danubyu, a small town not far from Yangon, in the Irrawaddy delta. Having lost experienced men in Yangon, the Burmese forces now numbered about 10,000, of mixed quality, including some of the king's best soldiers but also many untrained and barely armed conscripts. The stockade itself stretched a mile along the riverbank, and was made up of solid teak beams no less than 15 feet high.
In March 1825, a four thousand strong British force supported by a flotilla of gun boats attacked Danubyu. The first British attack failed, and Bandula attempted a counter charge, with foot soldiers, cavalry and 17 fighting elephants. But the elephants were stopped by rocket fire and the cavalry found it impossible to move against the sustained British artillery fire.
On 1 April, the British launched a major attack, pounding down on the town with their heavy guns and raining their rockets on every part of the Burmese line. Bandula was killed by a mortar shell. Bandula had walked around the fort to boost the morale of his men, in his full insignia under a glittering golden umbrella, discarding the warnings of his generals that he would prove an easy target for the enemy's guns. After Bandula's death, the Burmese evacuated Danubyu.

Arakan campaign (February–April 1825)

U Sa was left to command the remaining Burmese troops in Arakan after Bandula and the main battalions were ordered to withdraw from Arakan by Bagyidaw to meet the British invasion in Yangon in August 1824. Sa held on to Arakan throughout 1824 while the main focal point of the war played out in Yangon. After Gen. Archibald Campbell finally defeated Gen. Bandula in the Battle of Yangon in December 1824, the British turned their sights to Arakan. On 1 February 1825, an invasion force of 11,000 soldiers supported by a flotilla of gun boats and armed cruisers along the coast and a squadron of cavalry under the command of Gen. Morrison attacked Burmese positions in Arakan. Despite their superior numbers and firearms, the British had to fight depleted Burmese forces for nearly two months before they reached the main Burmese garrison at Mrauk-U, Arakan's capital. On 29 March 1825, the British launched their attack on Mrauk-U. (At the same time, Campbell also launched an attack on Bandula's positions in the Battle of Danubyu.) After a few days of fighting, the Burmese at Mrauk-U were defeated on April 1, coincidentally the same day Maha Bandula fell at Danubyu. Sa and the remaining Burmese forces evacuated and left Arakan. The British proceeded to occupy the rest of Arakan.

Armistice

On 17 September 1825, an armistice was concluded for one month. In the course of the summer, General Joseph Wanton Morrison had conquered the province of Arakan; in the north, the Burmese were expelled from Assam; and the British had made some progress in Cachar, though their advance was finally impeded by the thick forests and jungle.
Peace negotiations that began in September broke down by early October after the Burmese would not agree to British terms. The British had demanded no less than the complete dismemberment of the Burmese western territories in Arakan, Assam, Manipur and the Tenasserim coast as well as two million pounds sterling of indemnity. The Burmese would not agree to give up Arakan and the large sum of indemnity.

Battle of Prome (November–December 1825)

In November 1825, the Burmese decided to throw everything they had into last-ditch effort. Starting in mid-November, the Burmese forces, consisting mainly of Shan regiments led by their sawbwas, threatened Prome in a daring circular movement that almost surrounded the town and cut off communications lines to Yangon. In the end, the superior firepower of the British guns and missiles won out. On 1 December, Gen. Campbell, with 2500 European and 1500 Indian sepoys, supported by a flotilla of gun boats, attacked the main Burmese position outside Prome. On 2 December, Maha Ne Myo was killed by a shell launched from the flotilla. After Maha Ne Myo's death, the British dislodged the Burmese by 5 December.
The defeat in Prome effectively left the Burmese army in disarray. The Burmese army was in constant retreat from then on. On 26 December, they sent a flag of truce to the British camp. Negotiations having commenced, the Burmese were forced to accept the British terms to end the war, signing the Treaty of Yandabo in February 1826.
Treaty of Yandabo
The British demanded and the Burmese agreed to:-
Cede to the British Assam, Manipur, Rakhine (Arakan), and Taninthayi (Tenasserim) coast south of the Salween River
Cease all interference in Cachar and Jaintia
Pay an indemnity of one million pounds sterling in four installments
Allow for an exchange of diplomatic representatives between Ava and Calcutta
Sign a commercial treaty in due course
The first installment of indemnity was to be paid immediately, the second installment within the first 100 days from signing of the treaty, and the rest within two years. Until the second installment was paid, the British would not leave Yangon.
The Treaty of Yandabo was signed by General Campbell from the British side and Governor of Legaing Maha Min Hla Kyaw Htin from the Burmese side on 24 February 1826.  The Burmese paid 250,000 pounds sterling in gold and silver bullion as the first installment of the indemnity, and also released British prisoners of war. The war was thus brought to an end, and the British army moved south. The British army remained in the territories surrendered to it under the treaty and in the territories such as the Rangoon area which were occupied for several years in guarantee of the financial terms of the treaty.
After war
The treaty imposed a severe financial burden to the Burmese Kingdom, and effectively left it crippled. The British terms in the negotiations were strongly influenced by the heavy cost in lives and money which the war had entailed. Some 40,000 British and Indians troops had been involved of whom 15,000 had been killed. The cost to the British India's finances had been almost ruinous, amounting to approximately 13 million pounds sterling. The cost of war contributed to a severe economic crisis in India, which by 1833 had bankrupted the Bengal agency houses and cost the British East India Company its remaining privileges, including the monopoly of trade to China.
For the Burmese, the treaty was a total humiliation and a long-lasting financial burden. A whole generation of men had been wiped out in battle. The world the Burmese knew, of conquest and martial pride, built on the back of impressive military success of the previous 75 years, had come crashing down. The Court of Ava could not come to terms with the loss of the territories, and made unsuccessful attempts to get them back. An uninvited British resident in Ava was a daily reminder of the humiliating defeat.
In addition, the burden of indemnity left the Burmese royal treasury bankrupt for years. The indemnity of one million pounds sterling was considered a large sum in Europe at that time. It appeared more daunting when converted to the Burmese kyat equivalent of 10 million. The cost of living of the average villager in Upper Burma in 1826 was one kyat per month.
The British would wage two more less expensive wars against the weaker Burmese in 1852 and 1885, and annex Burma by 1885.